Inadequacies in the Legal System: Rape and Sexual Assault

 

By Bonnie Binggeli (The State University of New York at Fredonia ‘17)

Rape and sexual assault have rendered the face of domestic issues within the United States. It has been exemplified in the media that the U.S judicial and legal systems are not adequate in handling and prosecuting instances of sexual offenses. A series of highly publicized cases have shown how reform in the legal system is absolutely necessary. In the summer of 2016 the outcome of a case in which a woman under the influence of alcohol was brutalized by Stanford student Brock Turner flooded social and mainstream media.[1] The woman was discovered unconscious behind a dumpster with Turner on top of her.

Turner was supposed to serve a minimum six years sentence in prison for the three counts of felonies he was convicted of. However, at the discretion of Judge Aaron Persky, Turner’s sentence was shortened so severely that he only served a mere fraction of the minimum sentence he was supposed to have been dealt.[2] One of the justifications that Judge Persky provided in deciding to shorten Turner’s sentence indicated that he believed that alcohol was partly to blame for the defendant’s actions. Judge Persky stated that because alcohol was present, Turner’s judgement was clouded and he otherwise would have not committed such a heinous act.[3] Judge Persky also indicated that the crime was not committed with malice, and both were partially at fault because of the levels of intoxication. He did not believe that a minimum six year sentence was adequate because it would “ruin” the defendant’s life. In this paper I will argue that existing state statutes are not apt to handle instances of sexually offensive crimes. In particular, I will focus on the inadequacies that lie in specific state statutes, and which elements may promote better application of justice. Although there are variations within individual state statutes that define and punish sexual offenses, the primary investigation here will pinpoint the specific language that is ineffective. The argument is that individual state statutes are too vague in addressing what instances should be considered as sexual assault or rape. Individual state statutes cannot properly identify instances of sexual offenses, and the corresponding legal system is not prepared to adequately prosecute cases. The essence of the problem lies in the discrepancies between state and federal definitions of sexual offenses, as well as differences in punishments for them. The legal definition of sexual offenses in one state are not the same in another. There is no national consensus on what is considered to be a sexual offense. This leads the various court systems across the U.S to dictate judicial justice based on their own interpretation of a situation.

The lack of proper legal provisions in state and national legislation indicates that the legal system cannot properly carry out its duties. Instances of rape and sexual assault are not crimes that have been recently entwined in U.S statutes. These crimes have been cited in legal statutes dating to the birth of the U.S. The law should have evolved to the point where adequate measures are properly put in place to punish assailants. The vague and lenient provisions that are provided in statutes that address sexual offenses do not consider crimes of this nature to be taken as seriously as they should. Michelle Anderson suggests that the traditional definition of rape, dating back to English common law, does not accurately depict how instances of sexual offenses are carried out. It was stated in English common law, which is the basis of the U.S legal structure, that rape only occurred if a woman was forcibly threatened, injured, and outwardly expressed resentment toward her attacker.[4] A woman who was raped must have promptly reported a complaint against her assailant, otherwise the instance was void in the eyes of the law. The elements of centuries old English common law has influenced the traditional American image of rape in which an incident must be extremely violent and performed by a stranger.[5] Anderson states that this type of attack is rare and underrepresents actual cases of sexual offenses.

The Uniform Crime Report, issued by the FBI, established a new, or “revised,” definition of which acts constitute as rape in 2013. The definitions are not legally binding but reflect the norm and guidelines for how instances are generally perceived in a court of law. The revised definition is supposed to be more inclusive to all populations, particularly in cases of gender, as well as other acts that are not “traditionally” considered as sexually offensive. One of the biggest changes to the “legacy” definition is that “physical force,” or resistance by the victim, does not need to be included as an element of an attack to classify an incident as a rape or sexual assault. This provision was included in the revised definition to protect victims that may be unconscious due to the use of alcohol or drugs.[6]

The legacy definition defines rape and sexual assault as the “carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will.”[7] The revised definition now defines rape as the “carnal knowledge of a person, without the consent of a victim, including instances where the victim is incapable of giving consent because of his or her age or because of his/her temporary or permanent mental or physical incapacity.”[8] The revised definitions also include sexually offensive crimes in instances of sodomy and assaults that occur with the use of a foreign object. The importance of these definitions is how sexually offensive crimes are viewed, and how changing definitions can be applied to make legal statues more effective in protecting victims.

The changed definitions are representative of the decreased stereotype in what acts may now count as a sexual offense. However, the revised definition is not yet universally accepted in legal statutes. These definitions are not legally binding in a court of law, but provide a basis for how a jury or judge will view an instance of rape or sexual assault. The definitions represent direct perceptions of how instances were viewed in the past, and provide a good indication for how these crimes are going to be viewed and defined in future legislation. It will take time before the definitions have been fully integrated into legal statues. It was indicated by the Uniform Crime Report that if all instances of the revised definition were included in the reporting of sexually offensive crimes in 2013, there would have been 41.7 percent increase in cases.[9]

In practical application, the Brock Turner case exemplifies how the legacy definition largely dictates how legal statutes are applied and carried out in the judicial system. The revised definition is designed to support specific instances to protect victims who are “mentally incapable,” and hindered due to the presence of alcohol. The woman who was victimized by Turner will never be served proper justice because of severe lack of application of the revised definition. However, the large amount of public backlash that Turner and Judge Perky have received from the outcome of these cases represents a changing public dynamic in which there is an obvious desire for statute reform. Much progress has been made toward reforming the legal system in recent years, but there is still much to be done to combat the shortcomings in prosecution.

Kimberly Longsway and Joanne Archambault have partially attributed the prosecution’s shortcomings due to the “justice gap” in the legal system. The justice gap refers to the difference in sexual offenses reported in proportion to those that are actually committed.[10] Longsway and Archambault worked to identify the aspects that widen the “justice gap.” Data suggests that reported rapes and sexual assaults have dropped by 85 percent in the past 30 years.[11] Being so, some have praised the judicial system for improved prosecution when in fact there is a decrease in reporting of instances in proportion to those being committed. It is indicated that for every 100 rapes that are committed, 5-20 are reported, and of those cases that are reported only .4-5.4 are prosecuted, and of those cases that are prosecuted .2-5.2 are convicted.[12] Longsway and Archambault suggest that vagueness in legal jargon does not allow victims to be properly accepted as such in the legal system which lead to a wide gap in prosecutions.[13] Upwards of 50 percent of women who have been assaulted or raped will not state that they are victims due to the traditional perception of sexual offenses.[14]

The legal gaps and application of law can be seen and evaluated by analyzing individual state statutes. After evaluation it is quite evident that state applications do not have universal definitions of sexual assault and rape. Individual state statutes are not inclusive to all populations, are extremely vague, and in many cases are outdated. My research design is a comparative analysis between states of high and low rates of sexual offenses in distinguished regions. The data that is utilized in this study was published by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) between the years 2009 and 2010. The unit of comparison between states was rapes per 100,000 people. The regions were separated into Southern, Northeastern, Western, and Midwestern parts of the United States. The cross comparison of individual states was used to identify specific statutes that may account for the different rates in the unit of comparison. Examination of the differences in state statutes regionally will highlight which positive and negative legal factors are more prevalent in a certain area. Once the regional differences are established, a national comparison between regions can be made.

The Northeastern region has the lowest combined rape and sexual assault rates for both states investigated within a region. The two states under investigation are Connecticut and New Hampshire. Connecticut had the lowest rate of the two states at 18.7 and 16.3 per 100,000, in 2009 and 2010, respectively.[15] New Hampshire’s rates hovered around 30-31 per 100,000 between the years 2009 and 2010. In addition to differences in unit of comparison, there were also large discrepancies in arrest rates between Connecticut and New Hampshire. In 2010, Connecticut’s arrest rate equated to 40 percent.[16] In comparison, New Hampshire’s arrest rate were approximately 15 percent.[17] It is evident that Connecticut had a significantly higher arrest rate, in proportion to incidents that occurred, than New Hampshire. Being so, Connecticut appears to better address instances of sexual offenses.

Connecticut depicts acts of sexual assault in the first degree in which a victim is coerced to “engage in sexual intercourse… by force of a third person…intercourse with another person and that person and such another person is under thirteen years of age and the actor is more than two years older than such a person… and sexual assault that is aided by two or more persons” as class A or B felony.[18] Chapter 952, Section 53a-70 also indicates that a person who engages in sexual activity with a victim who is mentally incapable can be convicted of a class A or B felony. A sexual assault in which a victim is under 16 years of age is also distinguished as a class A felony upon conviction. If a person is found guilty under Section 53a-70 a defendant’s sentence will not be reduced by more than ten years if a victim is under the age of ten, or be reduced by more than five years if a victim is under the age of 16. A first offense will result in a 25-year sentence, while a second offense may be punishable up to 50 years.[19]

Section 53a-70c classifies acts of aggravated sexual assault of minors in the first degree. The definition here solely applies the traditional “meaning” of sexual offenses in which a victim is coerced with the force of a deadly weapon, and the assailant intended to cause bodily harm. A defendant found guilty of crime in this section will be convicted of a class A felony, and may serve up to 25 years in prison. Sections 53a-71 and 53a-73a have sexual assault in the second and fourth degrees categorized as either a C felony, or a class A misdemeanor.[20] These sections explicitly define instances of sexual assault in instances of cohabitation, physical helplessness, mental incapacitation, and those who are victimized in the presence of health care professionals. Those convicted of a class B or C felony must serve a sentence of two years and that cannot reduced by the courts. Acts that are categorized as a class A misdemeanor do not have minimum punishment unless the victim is under 16 years of age. If a victim is under 16 years of age the convicted persons will subjected to a minimum nine month sentence that shall be not shortened by the courts.[21]

New Hampshire’s Title LXII Criminal Code sections 632-A: 2, 632-A: 3, 632-A: 4 depict how the state defines instances of sexual assault as either a felony or misdemeanor. Sections 632-A: 2 and 632-A: 4 address Aggravated Felonious Sexual and Felonious Sexual Assault, respectively. Aggravated Felonious Sexual Assault outlined in section 632-A:2 consists of acts in which a person has used excessive force again a victim, and the victim expressed “physical helplessness.”[22] Section 632-A:3 simply defines acts that abide by the traditional definition of rape.

Connecticut and New Hampshire have similar statutes at face value. They both use the traditional definitions of rape and sexual assault. However, Connecticut bestows harsher punishments on its assailants than New Hampshire. For example, New Hampshire allows for all crimes defined under Felonies and Aggravated Felonious Assault to be tried under class A misdemeanors if a victim is of a certain age. One possibility for the difference in the unit of comparison is that Connecticut’s legal statute provides a strong deterrence for perpetrators. However, both states failed in explicitly applying the revised definition of rape. Felonious crimes did not address instances in which a victim may be unconscious, instances in which alcohol is present, acts of sodomy, and object penetration.

The Midwestern region has the largest difference in units of comparison between states. The two states investigated in the region were South Dakota and Wisconsin. South Dakota possesses the higher rate of sexual assault at 61.7 per 100,000 in 2009, and 47.9 per 100,000 in 2010.[23] In comparison, Wisconsin possesses one the lowest rates in this study at 16.8 and 20.9 per 100,000 in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Much like Connecticut and New Hampshire, the two states in the Midwestern region have similar arrests percentages that are reflective of the stark differences in rape rate comparison. South Dakota’s arrest rate in 2010 equated to12 percent[24], while Wisconsin’s arrest rate equated 42 percent.[25]

South Dakota’s legal statutes appear to be facially neutral. They generally apply the “legacy” definition with partial adaptations of the revised definition. Rape and sexual assault are defined in Title 22, Chapter 22, Section 1.[26] Subsection I defines acts against a victim who is less than thirteen years of age as Class C Felony. Subsection II states that any acts with “use of force, coercion, or threats of immediate bodily harm” will be considered as rape in the second degree, or a Class I felony.[27] The next two subsections III and IV define acts in which a person is incapable of giving consent due to a of lack mental capacity because of the presence of an “intoxicating agent.” Subsections III and IV are categorized as rape in the third degree and are Class II felonies. Section 22-22-2 also criminalize instances of sodomy and other forms of penetration, but does not indicate a minimum sentence or classification for how serious these crimes may be punished upon conviction. South Dakota does not impose a minimum sentence for perpetrators in which the victim is over the ages of 13 and 16, but does impose a higher minimum sentence for first time offenders who have contact with victims under said ages. A first time offender will receive a 15-year sentence, and will receive an additional ten years for a second offense in subsection I.[28] There is no designated protocol for instances defined of subsections, II, III and IV if a victim is older than 13 or 16 years of age.

Wisconsin appears to have more thorough statutes in defining sexually offensive crimes, but more generally applies the revised definition than South Dakota does. Wisconsin sexually offensive crimes are defined in Chapter 940, Crimes against Life and Bodily Security, Section 225.[29] Sexual assault in the first degree depicts acts of intercourse that result in bodily harm induced by coercion, or with the use of force with a deadly weapon, that are classified as a Class B felony. Sexual Assault in the second degree, categorized as a B felony, applies part of the revised definition that explicitly states sexual acts that occur when a victim is knowingly unconscious, or “intoxicated to the point” of not being able to give consent.[30]

Wisconsin appears to have applied the revised definition to a larger extent than South Dakota has. Both states are the only ones thus far that explicitly identify that a sexual offense is punishable by law even in the presence of alcohol or an additional “intoxicating agent.” However, South Dakota statues do not distinguish between rape and sexual assault, which indicates that the statutes could still largely adhere to the legacy definition when applied. This could influence statutes to apply more rigid definitions of sexual offenses and justifications during prosecution.

The Southern region accounted for 37.7 percent of national incidences in this study, which is the highest of all the regions. The states investigated in the Southern region were Arkansas and Virginia. Arkansas had a rape rate 47.7 was per 100,000 people in 2009, and 45.0 per 100,000 in 2010.[31] Out of the 1,312 incidents that occurred in 2010, there were only 164 arrests, which equates to a 12 percent arrest rate.[32] In comparison, Virginia has one of the lowest rates out of the states included in this study which capped out at 19 per 100,000 people in 2009 and 2010. In addition out of the 1,532 incidents that occurred in 2010, 366 arrests were carried out, which equates to an arrest rate double that of Arkansas at 23 percent.[33]

Arkansas’ sexual offenses are outlined in Title 5 (Criminal Offenses) Subtitle 2 (Offenses Against the Person) Chapter 14 (Sexual Offenses) and subchapter 1 general provisions.[34] Section 5-14-103, defines rape as an act that uses “forcible compulsion” in which a victim is unable to give consent due to to mental and physical handicaps that present the victim as “helpless.”[35] An act under this section is classified as a Class Y felony, which is most serious offense a person can be convicted of in Arkansas. Convictions that result in a class Y felony enforce a minimum sentence of 25 years if the victim is under the age of 14. Arkansas also explicitly defines instances of incest and bestiality as sexual offenses. Arkansas severely lacks in applying the revised definition, in which its statutes do not explicitly state that alcohol consumption or an intoxicating agent may be present during an assault. Evidently, the definition of rape applied in Arkansas primarily uses the legacy definition.

Arkansas makes a clear distinction between charges of rape and sexual assault in its statutes. Rape is a class Y felony, while sexual assault is categorized as a Class A felony, or misdemeanor. The provisions outlined in sexual assault statutes have much lower standards than those outlined in Arkansas’s rape statutes. Sexual assault in the first degree, section 5-14-124, pertains to acts in which a victim is in a subordinate position, such as a student, athlete, or a person under the care of a guardian.[36] Sexual assault in the third degree, section 5-14-125, states that a person may not commit an act against a person who is admitted in the justice system.[37] Sexual assault in the fourth degree, section 5-14-127, mainly addresses statutory claims in which there are large age discrepancies between two consenting parties.[38]

Arkansas’ statutes mainly abide by the legacy definition of rape. However, Arkansas is also one of the only states to separate crimes of sexual assault and rape. The only difference between sexual assault and rape in the Arkansas’ statutes is that sexual assault does not have to include elements of physical or mental helplessness. Therefore acts that may be not be seen as violent, due to lack of excessive force or resistance, may not be considered as serious offenses. Arkansas does not adapt elements of the revised definition, such as instances of penetration with an object or elements of sodomy, in its statutes. Arkansas has the least defined and exclusive laws out of the states that have been investigated thus far. This may indicate that Arkansas’s statutes are interpreted broadly, and account for the state’s consistently high rape rates.

Virginia’s statutes contain an ideal balance of the revised and legacy definitions. Title 18.2 (Crimes and Offenses Generally), Chapter 4, (Crimes against the Person), Article 7 (Criminal Sexual) defines acts that constitute as sexual offenses.[39] Section 18.2-61 determines that if in a situation a victim is forced against their will to commit a sexual act by “threat or intimidation,” or if a victim is “physically and mentally helpless,” then this is an instance of rape. If a victim is under the age of 13 this offense will result in a minimum sentence of 25 years, or life, depending on the age difference between the victim and perpetrator.[40] The above statute is the only element that strictly adheres to the legacy definition. Virginia statutes mainly differ is in its explicit language that identifies acts of sodomy, sexual battery, object penetration, and attempted rape as serious offenses. None of the states under investigation thus far have been this explicit in identifying all sexual offenses included in the revised definition. Virginia’s statutes show the willingness to prosecute crimes that other states have not yet fully recognized. Being so, its statutes are not exclusive and may be the most efficient in identifying sexually offensive crimes that are not “traditional.” The one aspect of the revised definition that Virginia does not explicitly depict in its legal statutes is rape and sexual assaults in the presence of drugs and alcohol. However, Virginia does identify that physical restraint does not have to be present in order for an assault to result in a conviction, as specified in section 18.2-67.6.[41]

Both states analyzed in the Western region, Wyoming and New Mexico, have relatively high rape rates. Wyoming’s rate per 100,000 fluctuated between 31.6 in 2009 and 29.1 in 2010[42], with an arrest rate that equated to 23 percent.[43] New Mexico’s rate was higher at 53.2 per 100,000 in 2009 and 46.2 per 100,000 in 2009, with an arrest rate that equated to 11 percent.[44] The statutes that outline sexual offenses in both states are very similar upon comparison.

Wyoming’s statutes addressing sexual offenses are primarily found in Title Six (Crimes and Offenses), Chapter 1 (General Provisions), and Article 3 (Sexual Assault).[45] Sexual assault in the first degree occurs when there is “submission of a victim” by actual application of force, or threat of death. Sexual assault in the first degree also identifies that victims may be “physically helpless,” or mentally incapable of consenting to sexual acts. Sexual assault in the second and third degrees primarily pertain to behaviors that influence submission of victims by threat to outside actors. Sexual assault in the first degree is a crime that is punishable by up to 50 years in prison, with a minimum sentence of 20 years.[46] Sexual assault in the second degree has a minimum sentence of two years that may not exceed more than twenty years. Sexual assault in the third degree only states that punishments may not exceed that of fifteen years. The definitions and legal applications of sexual offenses in Wyoming exemplify the “legacy definition.” Its statutes do not define various acts outlined in the revised definition.

New Mexico’s sexual offenses are outlined in Article 9. Section 30-9-11 depicts acts of criminal sexual penetration from first to third degree felonies. First degree sexual penetration is defined as an act in which a victim is “unlawfully, or intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse…to any extent with any object,” and may be accompanied by “force or coercion.”[47] If a victim is under 13 years of age the act is also considered a first degree felony. Criminal sexual penetration in the second degree is limited to incidents in which the victim is between the ages of 13 and 18, victims who are inmates confined in prisons, coercion of a victim that results in bodily harm, or within the presence of deadly weapon. Second degree criminal penetration of a child results in a three-year minimum sentence. Section 30-9-12, criminal sexual contact, identifies acts of touching without penetration as a fourth degree felony and has the same outlines as section 30-9-11.[48] However, if criminal sexual contact is “coerced or forced” without injury to the victim, the crime is dropped to a misdemeanor. There is little to distinguish New Mexico’s statutes from Wyoming’s.

The evaluations of this study conclude that most state statutes have not caught up to the revised definition that was establish in 2013. It can be indicated that states with the lowest rates of rape have generally applied most elements of the revised definition. However, states with low rates and elements of the revised definition did not apply these elements universally. Regardless of how the revised definition is applied, states whose statutes had more elements of the revised definition had lower rates of rape.

The findings here are meant to be an introductory step toward possible points of reform to improve the legal justice system in the United States. Obviously, legal recourse and statutes are the only elements investigated in this study. The results here only provide a fraction of an understanding as to why the “justice gap” exists. It can be concluded that as the revised definition becomes more accepted, and integrated into state statutes, that the legal system will be more apt in defining instances of sexual offenses. Eventually, there will be a universal definition that will no longer be refuted in the court of law. Universally accepted definitions and comparable punishments for sexually offensive crimes across states will lead to higher rates of justice nationally.

 

[1]                Sam Levin, “Stanford Sexual Assault: Read the Full Text of the Judge’s Controversial Decision.”

The Guardian (June, 2016) Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/14/stanford-sexual-assault-read-sentence-judge-aaron-persky

[2]      Ibid

[3]        Ibid

[4]        Michelle J. Anderson, “Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes Toward Acquaintance Rape Victims,” New Criminal Law Review 13, no. 4 (2010): 644-64.

[5]              Ibid, 645.

[6]              Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Rape Addendum,” Uniform Crime Report (2015): 1.

Online at:https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/resource-pages/rape_addendum-2015-_final

[7]        Ibid, 1.

[8]        Ibid, 3.

[9]        Ibid, 2.

[10]       Kimberly A. Lonsway, and Joanne Archambault, “The Justice Gap for Sexual Assault Cases:

Future Directions for Research and Reform,” Violence Against Women 18, no. 2 (2012): 145.

[11]     Ibid, 145.

[12]       Ibid, 157.

[13]       Ibid, 146.

[14]       Ibid, 146.

[15]              Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States by

Region, Geographic Division, and State-Table 4,” Uniform Crime Report (2010): Online at: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl04.xls

[16]            Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the U.S by State-

Table 5,” Uniform Crime Report, (2010): Online at: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl05.xls

[17]              Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Arrests by State-Table 69,”

Uniform Crime Report (2010): Online at: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl69.xls.

 

[18]       Connecticut. Sec 952-53a-70, 952-53a-70c, 952- 53a-71, and 952 -53a-73a. Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries, 2016. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. https://www.cga.ct.gov/current/pub/chap_952.htm.

[19]       Ibid, Sec 53a-70.

[20]       Ibid, Sec 53a-71, 53a-73a.

[21]     Ibid.

[22]       62 New Hampshire. Sec 632-A:2, 632-A:3, and 632-A:4. New Hampshire Statutes, 2015. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/nhtoc/nhtoc-lxii.htm.

[23]     Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State-Table 4.”

[24]     Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the U.S by State-

Table 5.”

[25]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Arrests by State-Table 69.”

[26]       22 South Dakota. Sec 22-22-1.1, and 22-22-2. South Dakota State Legislature legislative Research council, 2012. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://sdlegislature.gov/Statutes/Codified_Laws/ DisplayStatute.aspx?Type=Statute&Statute=22-22

[27]       22 South Dakota, Sec 22-22-1.1.

[28]     Ibid.

[29]     Wisconsin. Sec 940.225. Wisconsin State Legislature, 2011. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/940/II/225

[30]       Ibid, Sec 940.225.

[31]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State-Table 4.”

[32]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Arrests by State-Table 69.”

[33]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the U.S by State- Table 5.”

[34]       5 Arkansas. Sec 5-14-103, 5-14-124, 5-14-125, 5-14-126, and 5-14-127. Justia US Law,2015.   Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2010/title-5/subtitle-2/chapter-14/subchapter-1/

[35]       Ibid, Sec 5-14-103.

[36]       Ibid, Sec 5-14-124.

[37]       Ibid, Sec 5-14-125.

[38]       Ibid, Sec 5-14-127.

[39]       18 Virginia. Sec 18.2-61, 18.2-67.1, 18.2-67.2, 18.2-67.3, 18.2-67.4, and 18.2-67.7. Virginia Law, 2015.Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title18.2/chapter4/

[40]       Ibid, 18.2-61.

[41]       Ibid, 18.2-67.6.

[42]     Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States by Region, Geographic Division, and State-Table 4.”

[43]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Crime in the U.S by State- Table 5.”

[44]       Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S Department of Justice, “Arrests by State-Table 69.”

[45]       6 Wyoming. Sec 6-2-302, 6-2-303, and 6-2-304. The online home of the Wyoming Legislature, 2015. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://legisweb.state.wy.us/lsoweb/session/SearchResults.aspx?cx= 017715011151602216554:5hjhyhx9vlm&cof=FORID%3A11&ie=UTF-8&q=6-2-302&sa=Search.

[46]       Ibid.

[47]       9 New Mexico. Sec 30-9-10, 30-9-11, and 30-9-12. Justia US Law, 2009. Web. 12 Dec. 2016. http://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2006/nmrc/jd_ch30art9-c45d.html

[48]       Ibid, Sec 30-9-12.

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