By Grayson Shaw PO ’25
On Wednesday, September 15th, the United States announced the sale of nuclear submarines to the Australian government in order to advance their deterrent capabilities against Chinese influence in the Pacific. Complicating these matters, Australia had previously negotiated a deal with France over the sale of standard submarines, and the US had not communicated this with the French government. President Macron responded immediately by recalling the French ambassador to the US, and had harsh words of condemnation to describe American actions.
The United States has never let international cooperation get in the way of its own interests. For better or worse, this trend does not seem to be subsiding under the Biden Administration. For those who thought the new administration would usher in a new era of foreign policy, the French fallout is a worrying development. In promoting “America is back” foreign policy with nationalist undertones, further investigation suggests that there are more similarities than differences in the foreign policy of President Biden and his predecessor. Biden’s actions in Southeast Asia and Europe lay bare these similarities.
Southeast Asia
The similarities between two administrations begin in Southeast Asia: Both administrations posit that China is the single greatest international threat to American interests. On the campaign trail, Biden was seen as taking a softer approach to China, but his administration condemning China for rejecting student visas and their cyber attacks indicate that the tension between the two global superpowers is set to increase as opposed to fall.
Outside of China, President Biden’s approach throughout the region has been reminiscent of Trump’s. Unfortunately, this approach means all but ignoring the region. According to White House briefings, of the 27 recorded phone calls or 9 recorded virtual meetings in President Biden’s first three months in office, none were to a Southeast Asian leader. That same briefing found that none of Trump’s 50 phone calls in his first three months were to Southeast Asian leaders, either. When accounting for Vice Presidential meetings, the Biden Administration actually falls behind the Trump Administration for meeting leaders in Southeast Asia.
That is not to say differences between the two administrations are non-existent. Mainly, President Biden’s condemnation typically involves multilateral action when Trump’s did not. The submarine debacle is a perfect example of this. President Biden, in coordination with the United Kingdom and Australia, authorized the creation of the “AUKUS” military alliance with the sale of the submarines. Essentially, both Presidents doled out criticism to international actors several times throughout their respective administrations, but the methods of condemnation differed. Former President Trump’s foreign policy seemed to prefer more solo work, best seen in the Iran Nuclear Deal dissolution. Contrastingly, President Biden’s reprimands focus heavily on coordination and multiparty resistance.
Europe
Since the postwar period, The US’s closest allies have been on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. Previous movements towards internationalization with organizations such as the United Nations and the Northern Atlantic Trade Organization following World War II lend evidence toward the general favorability Europe has enjoyed from the United States. NATO, which ties together numerous global democracies with the end goal of promoting long-term stability throughout the world, would not exist if not for American and European collaboration. And even with rough spots in the past, the United States has benefited greatly from trade with Europe. However, contemporary developments to US-European relations have strained a normally strong alliance.
The rift with Europe began early in the Trump administration, just as it did with China. Before he even reached the Oval Office, Trump made a campaign promise to leave the Paris Climate Accords, and promptly left in the summer of 2017. This withdrawal started the ongoing trend of declining relations with Europe. Trump was notorious for stepping on the toes of European allies in order to pursue “America First” interests, which he normally defined unilaterally. For example, in a speech to the UN in September of 2019, Trump claimed, “The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots.” That is to say Trump consistently positioned himself as an anti-globalist who would confidently oppose global interests if he felt they were not in the interests of the United States.
Just as with China, President Biden’s Europe policy is once again different in everything but content. Beyond the AUKUS alliance, Biden’s Administration has encountered European resistance for several other reasons, like ignoring European advice on the Afghanistan withdrawal, opposing the Russian Nord-Stream II pipeline, and hesitating to lift COVID-19 travel restrictions, to name a few. At the end of the day, Biden’s Administration will always prioritize American interests over that of international cooperation, which the Commissioner of the European Union has argued is “eroding trust” between the two parties.
Moving Forward
The real question is how the United States moves forward from here. First, why are the two policies of seemingly polarized political parties similar? President Biden himself might be an explanation. Although he was sold as the most progressive president since FDR, Biden’s Congressional history is still that of moderation, if not conservatism. In 1974, Biden went as far as saying, “When it comes to civil rights and civil liberties, I’m a liberal but that’s it. I’m really quite conservative on most other issues.” Truly, Biden is no shining progressive, tending closer to a Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama than a Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren.
In contrast, United States foreign policy and its institutions could also be the reason why the differences between administrations seems to shrink over time. Essentially, American goals of dominance and global hegemony have remained unchanged since World War II, and unifying goals are bound to see similar procedures. This, in turn, makes changing institutions incredibly difficult, as organizations within the United States hold a sense of inertia and are resistant to change. Regardless of whichever political party controls a split or even unified legislative apparatus, institutions retain their practices and supersede the political atmosphere that they interact with. Since institutions like the DoD and Department of State comprise a majority of the foreign policy in the United States, President Biden would have to overcome numerous factors like institutional interests, cultures, and organization before making any legitimate changes.
This all raises the question: are the similarities between administrations actually positive or negative? Obviously, political polarization over appearances doesn’t seem very productive when the content of the policies are more similar than different. Contentious points over the two Presidents would make more sense if it weren’t for the structural similarities between the two administrations. The ongoing rivalry between the two is polarization for the sake of polarization. But, if the interest of the United States is to retain global hegemony, then President Biden’s inability to differ from the former administration fulfills this goal. On the other hand, if the United States wishes to change direction and promote a more international framework to its foreign policy coordination, that change won’t happen on America’s current trajectory. Overall, President Biden’s similarities in foreign policy seek to lead the United States on a similar path as his predecessor, furthering negative trends that have and will continue to hurt international appearance.
